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ARTICLE
The effects of prestige on collective performance
and information ﬂow in a strictly hierarchical
institution
Matt Offord 1,2,3, Roger Gill1 & Jeremy Kendal2,3
ABSTRACT Institutions such as the military aim to respond efﬁciently to complex logistical
challenges using a strictly hierarchical structure, where leaders are assigned a rank by senior
colleagues and team members are trained to obey leader commands. Anthropologists have
observed that leadership status outside of these top-down hierarchical institutions is often
affected by the attribution of prestige by non-leaders. Here we show that even in the strictly
hierarchical institutional context of the Royal Navy, informal prestige networks play a func-
tional role in leadership efﬁcacy and group-level dynamics. Speciﬁcally, a team leader’s
informal prestige is a far stronger predictor of team performance and rate of information
transmission during training exercises at sea than their formal rank. We ﬁnd that the more
decentralised the prestige network the more efﬁcient it is for disseminating information. The
implications of our ﬁndings for traditional conceptions of leadership in hierarchical institu-
tions and the effects of prestige on group-level behaviour are discussed.
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Introduction
Strictly hierarchical institutions such as the military rely on aformal leadership structure to coordinate and distributegroup activity in response to complex social and environ-
mental challenges. Here leadership is conferred by top-down
mechanisms and leadership style is dominance-based, char-
acterised by assertion, control, decisiveness, and assurance in
achieving goals (Kakkar and Sivanathan, 2017; Henrich et al.,
2015). An evolutionary framework approaches leadership in a
rather different way, a way which is rather more critical of the
need for leadership. Boehm (1993, 2001) asserts that humans are
inclined to adopt tactics employed to tolerate leaders only to the
degree that their direction beneﬁts the group. For example,
‘levelling’ behaviours can be used to undermine directives from
incompetent leaders (Offord et al., 2016) Evolutionary leadership
theory (ELT) asserts that group coordination problems are solved
by the coevolution of leader and follower strategies (Van Vugt
and Ahuja, 2010; Van Vugt, 2009; Van Vugt et al., 2008; King
et al., 2009). Top-down formal leadership models often ignore the
role of informal leadership through the mechanism of prestige.
Social psychology has long suggested that conferring of prestige
is an important strategy affecting leadership (Asch, 1948), yet this
has been largely neglected in traditional leadership studies. How
do leaders acquire prestige? von Rueden et al. (2014) in their
study of small scale societies in Bolivia discovered that physical
cues in addition to trust and kin group size were predictors of
leadership emergence. Until the 1940’s leadership studies largely
focused on traits which were mainly considered masculine in
addition to intelligence. This overlaps somewhat with this study
(Ibid.) but ignores the elements of trust and social capital. von
Rueden et al. (2014) also observe that the leaders they studied
were unlikely to claim greater reward for taking up the position as
a leader. This differs signiﬁcantly from contemporary western
views of leadership and supports the view that humans are
ambivalent about leadership and will not tolerate leaders who
attempt to gain disproportionately from their position (Van Vugt
and Ahuja, 2010; Van Vugt, 2009; Boehm, 2001). Both dom-
inance and prestige are viable social strategies contingent on the
speciﬁc context and personalities involved (Cheng et al., 2013).
Additionally, methods to determine prestige (such as assessing
the extent to which high status persons are gazed at) could
equally be measuring dominance (Ibid.). Since dominance and
prestige are both viable but distinct (Ibid.), methodologies to
capture prestige scores must not be confounded by dominance.
Cheng et al. (2013) address this by using peer assessment of
prestige and dominance. In our study, likewise, we use a peer
assessment of prestige.
Chudek et al. (2012) claims that prestige 'refers to learners’
preference for inferring cultural information from whoever
receives more attention and/or freely conferred deference from
other learners'. Cultural information is derived from high-prestige
actors and these actors receive disproportional attention. When
there is a signiﬁcant cost to overt assertion, leadership strategies
may be more reliant on prestige than on dominance, whereupon
the conﬁrmation of status to certain individuals is based on the
attention that he or she receives (Barkow et al., 1975; Grabo and
van Vugt, 2016; Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Van Vugt et al.,
2008). For followers, prestige in a specialised ﬁeld of expertise can
make potential leaders a reliable source for learned information
over, for instance, simple independent trial-and-error learning
(Henrich and Gil-White, 2001). 'Info-copying' prestigious indi-
viduals, where followers are strongly inﬂuenced to the point of
adopting similar language to a prestigious individual, effectively
trades the cheap acquisition of useful social information for the
costs of paying deference, and is one example of how leadership
based on prestige may emerge in groups (Henrich et al., 2015;
Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Van Vugt and Ahuja, 2010).
Learning from trusted models can be generalised beyond the
prestigious individual’s own domain of expertise, particularly
when information quality is opaque to the learner, resulting in
convergence of within-group knowledge, skills, values and beliefs
(Henrich and Boyd, 1998).
Henrich et al. (2015) demonstrate that prestige aids the cultural
emergence of cooperation, a genetic link in the selection of pro-
social leaders in small groups; and status differences are based on
cultural transmission in large groups. They use the example of the
'Big Man', a explanatory case of prestige in action (Ibid.). Big Men
do not usually inherit power, nor do they use coercion. They are
therefore reliant on the power of prestige to effectively manage
information goods(Ibid.). Prestigious individuals are able to
marshal resources which generate power without resorting to
coercion. Consequently, prestige may take the form of structural
factors determined by where an individual, group or even a
nation is placed within a network (Smith et al., 2014; McClurg
and Lazer, 2014).
This approach is radically different to traditional views of
leadership which place leaders as the sole focus of study without
the need to study followers or leader-follower interaction. This
paradigm began to decline after Ralph Stogdill’s review of lea-
dership traits in 1948 (Stogdill, 1948) that led to a realisation that
it would be very difﬁcult to narrow down a set of measurable
leader traits that might explain group performance (Stogdill,
1948; Antonakis et al., 2012). This led to a post-heroic era of
leadership studies that acknowledged the prior romanticised view
of leadership (Bligh and Schyns, 2007; Bligh et al., 2011; Meindl,
1995; Edwards, 2014) and explored the integration of leaders’ and
followers’ traits and behaviours with situational parameters
(Antonakis et al., 2012; Dinh and Lord, 2012; Zaccaro, 2007; Bligh
and Schyns, 2007). Nonetheless, an heroic outlook still prevails in
leadership studies situated in modern western contexts while, by
contrast, anthropologists have reported that many contemporary
peoples exhibit egalitarian and distributed leadership, considering
leadership as a collective social process (Bolden, 2011; Edwards,
2014; Bird and Bliege Bird, 2010; Boehm, 2001). Our theoretical
framework departs from the individualistic view of leaders with
the leader-follower relationship expressed as top-down control.
This framework is also followed by network and complexity
studies such as (Helbing et al., 2015) who demonstrate that top-
down control often fails to achieve its intended results in complex
networks. Cross-disciplinary studies of networks, complexity
science and applied mathematics demonstrate the power of
bottom-up and self-organised activity to inﬂuence social networks
(e.g., Helbing et al., 2015; Jalili and Perc, 2017).
The post-heroic paradigm of leadership studies includes a focus
on dynamic relations between actors and so has used social
network analysis to consider prestige and related concepts of
positional leverage and power (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2005; Karp,
2013; Larsson and Lundholm, 2010). For instance, actor cen-
trality, deﬁned by the number of ties transmitted and received by
an actor, has been considered as a proxy for power potential
(Brass and Burkhardt, 1993), and studies have found that cen-
trality correlates with perceived charisma and group performance
(Balkundi et al., 2011; Mehra et al., 2006; Sparrowe et al., 2001;
Bono and Anderson, 2005). Similarly, network science has pro-
vided compelling evidence that centrality is positively correlated
with the ability to disseminate information, including informa-
tion cascades (Jalili and Perc, 2017) Centrality contrasts with our
measure of prestige which is deﬁned only by the number of ties
an actor receives. Ego-centred networks, comparing individuals’
networks rather than a leader’s position within the whole net-
work, have been used to address the role of prestige (Parker et al.,
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2013; Hoppe and Reinelt, 2010; Balkundi and Kilduff, 2005). For
example, Parker et al. (2013) discovered that academic leadership
is positively affected by large social networks. (Henrich and Gil-
White, 2001) deﬁnes prestige as 'freely conferred deference' which
is mathematically different to the notion of centrality used by
leadership scholars (e.g., Balkundi et al., 2011) which describes
structural position and does not discriminate between relation-
ships which are freely conferred or reciprocal. This character-
isation of prestige is missing from traditional leadership studies.
Our study is the ﬁrst that we are aware of to combine anthro-
pological approaches to prestige with traditional leadership lit-
erature and to apply it in a strictly hierarchical context. Kakkar
and Sivanathan (2017) take the step of applying the argument
about dominance versus prestige to modern politics, ﬁnding that
dominance, rather than prestige-based leadership, is positively
correlated with economic uncertainty. Given this, we might
predict that dominance-based leadership should predominate in
military institutions which are commonly act in highly uncertain
environments. However that study does not consider the uncer-
tainty of a military environment which should, by their ﬁndings
increase the level of dominance (Ibid.).
In our study, we examine the role of leader prestige in the
Royal Navy (RN), an ostensibly hierarchical institution, during
complex training tasks characterised by highly uncertain envir-
onments. The functional structure on RN warships is a series of
nested hierarchies typical of Industrial Age organisations.
Although all individuals report ultimately to the Commanding
Ofﬁcer, they are arranged in Divisions, based on specialisation
(e.g., the Marine Engineering Department) (see Fig. 1). Indivi-
duals report to functional supervisors (usually in the same spe-
cialisation), who report to Senior Rates, who report to Heads of
Department. Only at this point is information shared with that of
other departments amongst the Command Team (comprising the
Heads of Department and the Commanding Ofﬁcer). This has the
effect of creating specialised channels for each kind of activity
which cycles information from the Commanding Ofﬁcer to the
lowest levels in the hierarchy. Each task is allocated a leader at the
lowest level required to achieve the task. Therefore simple tasks
are led by supervisors in the speciﬁc specialisation required (e.g., a
seaman supervisor for a seamanship task, such as launching a
boat). More complex tasks require higher-level supervisors with
whole-ship tasks being led either by the Commanding Ofﬁcer or
Executive Ofﬁcer. Reporting of sub-tasks, in this case, is usually
accomplished through the chain of command for each Division,
so activity is nearly always achieved through specialised teams.
The RN is particularly interesting precisely because formal
leader and follower roles are strongly pre-deﬁned principally for
the purpose of optimising coordinated group-level exercise out-
comes. Bloch (2008) described such roles as the transcendental
social, referring to imagined public roles or positions that con-
tinue to exist beyond the term of the role-holder. In strongly
hierarchical institutions such as the RN, prestige and social
behaviour is expected to be strongly inﬂuenced by the transcen-
dental social, deﬁned by rank, resulting in efﬁcient group-level
outcomes. Our study challenges this assertion by examining the
degree to which differential symbolic capital and prestige accrued
by role-holders affects social behaviour and group outcomes. Our
measures of informal prestige are derived from Offord et al.
(2016)'s qualitative focus group study that proposed a leadership
model in which crew might confer prestige via two modes of
interaction, advice and participation, resolved into four dimen-
sions: seeking credible professional and personal advice plus
engaging in sports and social participation. In Offord et al. (2016)
we used qualitative methods to identify two modes of interaction
that affect prestige-development. Although advice networks ﬁt
neatly with the 'information goods' approach (Henrich et al.,
2015) the notion of interaction via sports or social events has a
less obvious connection. Although the use of participation net-
works is not derived directly from 'information goods' theory, we
allow for the possibility that trust built up through participation
could affect leader prestige and cohesion to inﬂuence team per-
formance. We needed to ﬁnd out whether the trust built up
through participation would act as a modifying inﬂuence on team
performance and the ﬂow of information within groups.
First, we report empirical network analyses, examining the
effect of group-leader prestige on team performance and infor-
mation transmission, before using computer simulation to
explore the possible effects of informal prestige network structure
on the rate of information transmission through the network. We
demonstrate that, far from relying on traditional top-down lea-
dership, naval teams use distributed leadership enabled through a
spread of the prestige network operating at all levels of the
organisation. We suggest that the evolution of leadership from
early egalitarian roots to a modern hierarchical (command and
control) structure is too simplistic a model. In fact, the formal
hierarchy is supplemented by an informal prestige structure
which is often ignored and yet is vital for group coordination.
Empirical analysis
We collected interaction network data for eight crews from Mine
Counter Measures Vessels (MCMV) and two crews from an
Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV). Measures of team-leader interac-
tion and rank were correlated against (i) team performance,
measured during training exercises performed on the MCMVs,
and (ii) information transmission during complex training exer-
cises on the OPV. Practical limitations restricted our collection of
team performance data to the MCMVs and information trans-
mission data to the OPV; possible effects of vessel type are con-
sidered in the discussion. An MCMV training period is four
weeks, generating approximately 800 assessment reports in total,
but for various practical reasons information transmission data
could not be collected. The OPV training programme is only one
week and did not generate a statistically viable sample of per-
formance assessments but did allow the collection of detailed
information transmission data.
Fig. 1 The diagram shows how RN warship are split into divisions which act
as separate information conduits up the chain of command The Divisional
System separates the pastoral care and functional control of sailors into
departments deﬁned by occupational specialisation (e.g., engineers or
communication specialists). Within each department, junior sailors are
supervised by Leading Hands, who are managed by Senior Rates and
Ofﬁcers. The department is led by DHODs and HODs, who report to the
Commanding Ofﬁcer via the senior HOD, the Executive Ofﬁcer
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Data were collected from eight MCMVs comprising 323 crew
members in totalin the vicinity of the River Clyde, Scotland, in
2012, and from two crews (a total of 78 crew) from an OPV
located in the Falkland Islands in 2015. The crew (called a 'Ship’s
Company') are very similar in make-up and size (around 40
(range= 39–43, mode= 39)) across the two types of vessel,
although the MCMV crew is permanent while the OPV changes
crew every six months. In total 401 sailors participated in the
study, creating 4 sociograms per ship, that is 40 sociograms in
total.The average age of the participants was 32.4 years and the
Ships’ Companies were predominately male (12% female). All
personnel volunteered to participate fully, so a 100 percent return
of the data was achieved.
Prestige network analysis. After piloting a questionnaire on a
separate MCMV (performed in 2012), we collected interaction
network information on all vessels by administering a ques-
tionnaire that identiﬁed a list of the ship’s company and asked the
volunteer to mark against relevant crew in response to one of the
following (each question on a separate page):
1. Do you go to this person for professional advice?
2. Do you go to this person for personal advice?
3. Do you play sport with this person?
4. Do you socialise with this person?
From these data, we constructed prestige networks, or directed
graphs, based on each of the four types of interaction
(professional advice, personal advice, sport, socialising). For each
type of interaction, our measure of prestige for each actor, i, is
given by
P′DðiÞ ¼
dðiÞ
g  1 : ð1Þ
This is the number of edges (or ties) an actor receives, or
indegree, d(i), standardised by the possible number of edges, g−1.
This measure is adapted from Wasserman and Faust (1994, p.
179)’s measure of centrality, which includes both the number of
ties transmitted and received by an actor. The use of directed
graphs for advice networks is straightforward since requests for
advice are directed at speciﬁc individuals and one-way. Although
the responses to the participation questions (e.g., do you play
sport with this person?) are directed, they are also commonly
reciprocal in practice. This suggests a framework other than that
of freely conferred prestige (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001) and
therefore compares the 'information goods' theory with other
means of accumulating prestige. An example sociogram is shown
in Fig. 2.
Sociograms were obtained from 8 MCMV and 2 OPV
warships. These 10 crews contributed a sociogram in each of
the four dimensions, totalling 40 network graphs, that is 10
graphs for professional, personal, social and sports prestige. The
number of crew was usually 44, although some vessels had up to 4
extra persons for training. Variation in the number of vertices was
accounted for by normalising all network statistics between one
and zero. The average density for all 40 sociograms was 0.17, but
was higher for social and professional networks (0.19 and 0.18
respectively). Density was lower for sports networks (0.15) and
lowest for personal advice networks (0.14). The average number
of edges (or ties) between vertices varied between 223 and 309,
with more ties for professional and social networks, a reﬂection of
the density ﬁndings. The diameter of all the networks was four,
except the professional sociogram with ﬁve. This small diameter
indicates close-knitted teams. Figure 3 summarises that prestige
values for the MCMV and OPV vessels. The within-crew
variation of prestige across the eight MCMV crews was larger
than across the two OPV crews. Although the relative scores
within each sample demonstrate a similar proﬁle, the absolute
scores were higher within the MCMV community. MCMV crews
Fig. 2 A typical social network from an RN warship illustrating levels of
prestige among crew members A sociogram from an MCMV constructed
from a hypothetical sociomatrix of typical prestige scores. The colours of
the nodes indicate rank. From the highest to the lowest ranks the nodes are
coloured: blue= ofﬁcers; yellow= senior rates; green= leading hands; red
= able rates. The size of the node is proportional to its prestige
Fig. 3 Sub-Figure A - MCMV Prestige Box Plot Sub-Figure B - OPV Prestige
Box Plot. The distribution of prestige among two different classes of
warship MCMVs(n= 363) and OPVs (n= 78) crews, where boxes show
data points between the 25th and 75th percentiles, and whiskers show the
minimum and maximum values
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are largely stable over a period of 2 years, albeit that there is
signiﬁcant change in personnel at any time. OPV crews, on the
other hand, only spend 6 months in the Falkland Islands,
although they remain together as a unit when operating other
vessels in the same class. Although the crew are well known to
each other, they have had relatively little time to operate together
within that speciﬁc environment, and therefore prestige networks
are still developing.
We examined the degree to which prestige is conﬂated with
rank, which is a likely status marker. Figure 4 shows that
professional advice is highly correlated with rank. This assess-
ment was conducted for the MCMVs but we discovered a similar
connection on the OPVs. While we ﬁnd the highest mean
correlation of rank with the professional prestige, it is its mean
divergence of 31.5% which is perhaps surprising. Other prestige
categories exhibit lower or even no correlation at all. It is
interesting to note that both sporting and social interactions
appear heterogeneous with respect to rank.
Team performance. Operational Sea Training took place during
several weeks of intensive operations observed by sea-riders.
These operations are broken down into so-called serials which
range from basic operational skills to ﬁreﬁghting, damage control
and complex warfare operations. Each team (e.g., engineering
department, seamanship department etc.) completed a number of
serials, while some serials involved multiple departments or the
whole ship. Each serial was assessed by sea-riders according to a
training manual called the Operational Sea Training Guide. We
had access to the sea-riders’ assessments of team performance
over 345 admissible serials carried out across the MCMVs, and
note that internal reliability was high (Cronberg’s α= 0.904). Of
the 345 serials, the majority of groups (n) conducted each serial
only once each while the remaining groups (16) conducted no
more than 2 serials each. We treated each serial to be independent
of one another as the considerable variation across serial tasks
and environmental conditions was likely to swamp the effect of
repeated measures in the minority of teams that contributed more
than one serial. We obtained qualitatively similar results using
only groups that contributed one serial to the dataset. For each
team, the prestige variable for the formal team leader was com-
pared with serial assessment using a logistic regression (carried
out using Stata 13 statistical software). Each form of prestige
(professional, informal, sport, social) was used as a predictor
variable in separate models, in addition to a model that used the
mean all four types of prestige as a predictor variable. The
assessment data were originally ordinal, taking the following
possible levels: 1. Unsatisfactory, 2. Below standard, 3. Satisfac-
tory, 4. Very satisfactory, 5. Good, 6. Very good.
We transformed these data into a binary response variable
because of positive skew in the distribution of scores and some
rarely used categories. The cut-off point was the Very Satisfactory
assessment, which was designated high, as these were superior
assessments. Satisfactory and lower assessments were deemed as a
low performance. A logistic regression (see Table 1) revealed that
all four types of prestige positively correlated with team
performance during Sea Training, with large effect sizes. The
combined model, using the mean of the four interaction types as
the predictor variable, achieved the largest effect size and also
demonstrated the highest goodness-of-ﬁt and best variance
statistics.
Table 1 also shows that rank is insigniﬁcant in the model. This
is primarily due to the wide range of ranks of leaders of the serials
we observed. Team cohesion (measured by calculating density)
also failed to make a signiﬁcant contribution to team perfor-
mance. There was, however, a non-signiﬁcant cohesion result for
all four networks. A full explanation of our treatment of density
can be found at Appendix A.
Information transmission. Information transmission data were
collected from two different crews on the OPV. The lead author
(MO) was present in his capacity as leader of a training team to
conduct Operational Sea Training. This role is normal practice
and so was unlikely to affect participant behaviour. Dyadic
exchanges of information were recorded over the last 48 hours of
the crews’ training package during which the complexity and
intensity of the exercises had increased to the point where
information management had become critical to task success. The
information transmission data concern two exercises (or serials).
The ﬁrst was a Damage Control Exercise beginning with a
simulated air attack performed by two Royal Air Force Typhoon
aircraft who ﬂew attack proﬁles against the Ship. After a period of
tracking these aircraft and responding to their actions using
Ship’s weapons, extensive damage was simulated. The damage
took the form of ﬁres, ﬂoods, equipment failure and casualties.
Information from damage sites within the ship and sensors,
monitoring the external environment, was passed from person to
person until it reached the Commanding Ofﬁcer and was added
manually to special information boards, called State Boards, on
the Bridge.
During the exercise a number of scenarios were simulated
throughout the ship by the training team. For example, a
compartment would be ﬁlled with non-hazardous smoke to
simulate a ﬁre. Members of the Ship’s Company were observed as
they dealt with the incident. Our researcher (MO) witnessed how
messages (concerning the incident) were conveyed to the
Commanding Ofﬁcer, recording the exact particulars of the
information in a note book and noting how this information was
received and how it was noted on the Incident Board on the
Bridge, from which the Commanding Ofﬁcer was briefed.
Although it was possible to convey the information by telephone,
Fig. 4 A box plot illustrating how formal rank correlates with informal
prestige scores. (n= 320). The box plots show the median correlation of
rank and prestige as a white line. 25th and 75th percentiles appear below
and above this line respectively. Minima and maxima are indicated by
whiskers and the mean correlation is stated in each box
Table 1 Summary of logistic regressions of team
performance and independent variables
Variable Odds ratio p≥ χ2
Professional prestige 6.065 0.000**
Personal prestige 4.814 0.000**
Sports prestige 2.854 0.001**
Social prestige 2.616 0.005**
Combined prestige 12.947 0.000**
Rank 0.995 0.936
**p≤ 0.01 (N= 345)
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most information was relayed in person to the Bridge via a
messenger. MO was able to follow the messenger to the bridge
and record the event as a part of his duties as an observer.
Information passed in this way could have been passed
successfully, become misunderstood, or completely ignored. Of
the 154 observed attempts to pass information all were
successfully transmitted or ignored, none were garbled. It is
important to note that during periods of intense stress, people
experience perception issues, focussing intensely on certain
information and ﬁltering out other data. This is why a binary
outcome prevailed. An example of this issue is an attempt to pass
critical information by a high rank but low prestige individual
witnessed by MO. In this case the individual passed the message
personally on the Bridge but was completely ignored by the
Bridge team who were absorbed in another event to the exclusion
of all others. This in itself does not signify that low prestige was
the causal effect but demonstrates how messages can fail to be
passed. The observations were made during an intense phase of
training when communication was occurring throughout the
Ship. MO was unable to observe every instance of information
transmission in such a frenetic environment. However he was
able to draw on his experience and knowledge of the training
programme to ensure that mission critical events were observed.
The information types were varied. For example, information
may be about the state of a casualty (e.g., the wounds received by
a casualty and whether they are stable), progress with ﬁre-ﬁghting
(e.g., the ﬁre in a certain location is extinguished). Other
information may include the readiness of personnel to conduct
damage control (e.g., there are 5 persons at the repair post,
dressed and ready for ﬁre-ﬁghting). Further information may
come from personnel operating sensors and weapon systems
regarding size and disposition of enemy forces. The latter
information is extremely dynamic, especially when considering
the movement of enemy aircraft; these reports are usually called
out on communications networks and transmitted via speakers
on the Bridge. Since this information is simply a public broadcast,
it was not considered in our observations. However, information
gathered below decks concerning damage control (the so-called
'internal battle') was generally passed from person to person and
was potentially subject to prestige bias. The urgency of this
information was such that communication was always oral.
Phone communication is avoided due to potential electrical
failures and because it is often impossible for ofﬁcers to
manoeuvre the Ship and answer the telephone at the same time.
Nevertheless, phone communications were occasionally used
from points within the Ship directly to the Bridge. Most
communication was face-to-face, generally passing up the chain
of command and remaining within the divisional structure
described in our introduction. Often the information would be
passed outside of departments if it was deemed to be quicker for
example, to pass the information to a trusted individual or an
individual who happened to be going to the Bridge. Technical
information stayed strictly within technical departments (e.g.,
electrical or mechanical damage) as it would be incomprehensible
outside of specialist departments.
MO witnessed 154 attempts to exchange of information
directly and assess the success of attempts to pass operational
information from one sailor to another. Information was often
passed directly from a person at the scene of the incident who
travelled to the Bridge to tell the individual amending the State
Board or directly to the Commanding Ofﬁcer. Logistic regression
was used to examine the effect of leader prestige on the success or
failure of information transmission.
An attempt to pass information could be clearly observed since
the sender would address the receiver loudly and formally, using
standard reporting formats. The receiver then repeats the same
information to check their understanding, thus it was possible to
determine if the information was received or not. In reality,
certain individuals were clearly ignored or told their information
was not a priority when attempting to pass information. It was
straightforward to determine whether or not ignored information
was genuinely low priority due to MO’s position as an expert
trainer. Of the 154 attempts to pass on information, 21 attempts
involved the same pair of individuals (13.69%). We obtained
qualitatively similar results using only pairs that contributed one
transmission attempt to the dataset.
Our investigation of information transmission showed only the
advice networks to be signiﬁcant: both the personal-advice
prestige of the transmitter and receiver predicted successful
information transmission, but only the professional-advice
prestige of the transmitter predicted successful information
transmission. In contrast to the team performance results, rank
was signiﬁcant in univariate regressions with information
transmission, but consistent with the team-performance results,
including both rank and prestige as ﬁxed variables in a
multivariate logistic regression showed that the advice-based
prestige, but not rank, correlated with information transmission
(see Table 2). Participation networks do not have a signiﬁcant
effect on information transmission and can be excluded from
consideration of an “information goods” approach to prestige.
Simulation
The observed signiﬁcant effect of informal prestige, but not rank,
on information transmission only considered dyadic information
transmission events. We used computer simulations (using igraph
package on the R platform (Version 3.3.2.) to extrapolate by
exploring, in principle, how rank distribution across a prestige
network might affect the rate of information percolation across
the entire Ship’s Company. To this end, we created a network that
was similar in population size and rank distribution to a typical
crew from the MCMVs and OPV (see Fig. 5).
To predict the effect of network topology on patterns of
information transmission, edge density is held constant across
conditions using the mean density of 0.17 recorded across all 10
collected sociograms. The simulated sociograms were based on
advice (professional and personal) networks as these have already
Table 2 The effect of rank and prestige on the dissemination
of information
Variable Coefﬁcient p≥ |z|
Rank (T) 1.54 0.125
Rank (R) 0.697 0.486
Rank (μ) 0.977 0.854
Professional prestige (T) 12.8237 0.000**
Professional prestige (R) 1.644 0.4243
Professional prestige (μ) −3.800305 0.515
Personal prestige (T) 17.5282 0.000**
Personal prestige (R) 10.2621 0.000***
Personal prestige (μ) 1.406 0.010*
Social prestige (T) 0.21256 0.937
Social prestige (R) −1.1288 0.641
Social prestige (μ) −39.6043 0.773
Sports prestige (T) 0.8009 0.842
Sports prestige (R) −4.2146 0.270
Sports prestige (μ) −119.9554 0.542
Combined prestige (T) 9.518 0.000**
Combined prestige (R) 3.18 0.001**
Combined prestige (μ) 41.5538 0.000**
Where μ indicated the mean value of the transmitter (T) and receiver (R) prestige, and
Combined is the effect of average prestige score across all four forms of interaction (*p ≤ 0.05;
**p≤ 0.01; N= 154)
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been shown to have a positive effect on information transmission.
We compared four topologically distinct conditions, illustrated in
Fig. 6:
i. Random-tie network: edges are randomly distributed, assum-
ing the constant density and population size; i.e., there is no
relationship between rank and prestige.
ii. Real-world network: we use one of the collected sociograms
that happens to exhibit the mean density and population size.
There is a moderate correlation between rank and prestige
such that higher ranks (deﬁned as Ofﬁcers and Senior Rates
(blue and yellow nodes)) tend to have a higher level of
prestige.
iii. High-rank, high-prestige network: high-ranking nodes,
Ofﬁcers and Senior Rates (blue and yellow nodes), held
higher prestige than low-ranking nodes.
iv. Low-rank, high-prestige network: low-ranking nodes, Lead-
ing Hands and Able Rates (green and yellow nodes), held
higher prestige than high-ranking nodes.
For each condition, we run 1000 simulations to predict how
efﬁciently information spreads through the network, measured by
saturation time (Fig. 7). Each simulation begins by randomly
seeding the population with an informed actor selected from the
low-ranking ‘junior rates’ (vertices numbered between 23 and 39),
who are the sailors engaged in ﬁghting ﬁres, engaging enemy
targets etc, who are the common source of new information. At
each time step, informed actors simultaneously attempt to pass
information to naive actors. The model is shown at Fig. 7.
We consider two alternative modes by which prestige affects
the probability of transmission:
i. Unweighted transmission, where the probability of informa-
tion passing from an informed individual to a connected
neighbour is given by the mean prestige value across the
network, n1
Pn
i PðniÞ. Thus, the probability of transmission
from an informed individual to each connected neighbour is
the same.
ii. Prestige-weighted transmission, where the probability of
information passing from an informed individual to a
connected neighbour is given by the in-degree of the
information source node, P′D(ni). In other words, among
individuals selected as those to whom a sailor would go for
information, transmission is more likely if the potential
information source has a high prestige score.
Fig. 5 Model sociogram created for simulation with typical features from
our advice-based social network analysis of warships Ofﬁcers (the highest
rank) are shown in blue, followed by Senior Rates (yellow), Leading Hands
(green) and Able Rates (red), who are the lowest rank
Simulation networks
Top heavy network
Random network
Boom heavy network
Real world network
Oﬃcers
Senior Rates
Leading Hands
Able Rates
Fig. 6 An illustration of four different types of simulated social networks used to compare information transmission. The 'random' distribution condition
shows that higher prestige vertices (shown by larger circles) are represented by all ranks. The 'top heavy' and 'bottom heavy' conditions show large blue or
red vertices respectively. The 'real world' condition demonstrates some features of the 'top heavy' network in that the prestigious actors are ofﬁcers or
senior rates. Additionally this network shows greater isolation of the red, lower ranking nodes than any of the other networks
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Note that the prestige network edges are directed towards
individuals from whom a focal individual would seek informa-
tion, so information ﬂows in the opposite direction to the directed
edges, ﬂowing from prestigious individuals who are sought out
for information to those that seek the information. Also, both
modes of prestige transmission exhibit the same average prob-
ability of transmission across the network, and we do not have
empirical data distinguishing which of these two modes was
employed by the sailors.
We assume that not all information transmission is a function
of the prestige network topology. So if, at each time step, an
informed actor does not transmit information via the prestige
network, there is a constant probability of non-prestige trans-
mission to a randomly selected recipient, set arbitrarily at 0.1, so
eventually the network will become saturated.
For all four simulated conditions, the unweighted transmission
mode typically resulted in a longer saturation time and greater
variation in saturation time than the prestige-weighted trans-
mission mode did (see Table 3). Since mean prestige across both
modes is identical, it is the variance of prestige among connected
actors that explains the differences in efﬁciency of transmission.
For the non-random network structures (types ii–iv), cliques of
prestige featured fast information transmission within the clique
but slower transmission to other parts of the network. The
random-tie distribution model had enough variance in prestige to
create information channels of relatively high prestige individuals
combined with a lack of cliques or information bottle-necks. A
clique is deﬁned as a subgraph where the actors have all possible
ties present among themselves. Informally cliques represent
groups within groups who communicate readily within their own
group but may not be as well connected outside of the clique. The
random-tie network had the lowest number of cliques (5),
whereas the real world network had 8 signiﬁcant cliques. The
largest number of cliques (10) was found in both the top and
bottom heavy networks.
For both transmission modes (unweighted and prestige-
weighted), information spread most efﬁciently in the random-tie
network condition, followed by both the top-heavy and bottom-
heavy networks, while the real-world network took the longest
time to achieve saturation and also exhibited the greatest varia-
tion in time to saturation. We also observed that the prestige-
weighted mode was considerably more efﬁcient that the
unweighted model, this is measured by the number of time steps
to achieve saturation. The results are shown in Fig. 8.
Discussion
Our empirical results suggest that while both advice- and
participation-based prestige conferred to group leaders affects
Select random 
actor from 
crew vector
Establish 
connected 
neighbours
Successful
Successful
?
?
Add actors who 
receive 
informaon to 
informed vector
YES
All actors are 
naive
Aempt to transmit 
informaon to random 
member of crew (p=0.1).
NO
NO
For n steps (simulated me periods)
Null model: aempt to 
inform connected neighbours 
(p=0.17)
Presge model: aempt to 
inform connected neighbours 
(p=indegree) 
For n steps (simulated me periods)
YES
Fig. 7 The production system used to drive information transmission simulations, illustrated using Universal Modelling Language (UML)
Table 3 Results prestige-bias transmission simulations
Model and condition Maximum timea Mean timeb SD 95% CI
Unweighted—Random distribution 17 4.61 2.61 5.79e−2
Unweighted—Real world distribution 25 7.26 4.46 8.82e−2
Unweighted—‘Top heavy’ distribution 23 5.91 3.45 6.67e−2
Unweighted—‘Bottom heavy’ distribution 25 6.48 3.89 7.22e−2
Prestige-weighted—Random distribution 5 3.48 0.59 3.67e−2
Prestige-weighted—Real world distribution 11 5.61 1.04 6.46e−2
Prestige-weighted—‘Top heavy distribution 9 4.25 0.81 5.022e−2
Prestige-weighted—‘Bottom heavy’ distribution 9 4.60 0.96 5.99e−2
aMaximum time to achieve saturation
bMean time to achieve saturation
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group performance, only advice-based prestige positively affects
dyadic information transmission. While participation-based
prestige was not a part of our 'information goods' mode Hen-
rich and Gil-White (2001) participation networks were retained
to observe if they affected the spread of information. In particular,
while the personal advice-based prestige of both the sender and
the receiver correlate with successful information transmission,
only professional advice-based prestige of the sender, and not the
the receiver, correlates with successful transmission. Models
including both prestige and rank as predictor variables ﬁnd that,
unlike prestige, team-leader rank had no effect either on team
performance or on the odds of dyadic information transmission.
Extrapolating by simulation to explore the effect of rank dis-
tribution on rate of information saturation indicates that the real-
world rank distribution is particularly poor at facilitating infor-
mation transmission compared to either random and top or
bottom-heavy distributions of rank with respect to prestige.
While these ﬁndings do not show that rank, as a transcendental
social construct, is unimportant for the efﬁcient day-to-day
running of the Royal Navy, it does suggest that informal prestige
can have an important effect on both leadership efﬁcacy and
information transmission on operations.
Anthropological theories of prestige as a channel for cultural
transmission (e.g., Henrich and Gil-White, 2001) suggest a pos-
sible explanation for the ﬁnding that prestige in leaders is cor-
related with higher team performance. Advice networks,
particularly professional prestige, seem likely conduits for
'information goods' which are required to coordinate groups. It is
likely that prestigious leaders are able to move information
around their team efﬁciently because their prestige confers value
on that information. Thus high prestige leads to an 'unthinking
acceptance' of an actor as a generally reliable source of infor-
mation while low-prestige sources are rejected with little con-
sideration of the actual content (Asch, 1948; Greenﬁeld and
Fig. 8 a The number of informed persons over time in the unweighted mode b The number of informed persons over time in the prestige-weighted mode.
Information spread over time for prestige-weighted and unweighted modes The n value represents the number of possible successful transmissions over
1000 simulations. Consequently the darker and larger circles represent the most likely predictions
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Kuznicki, 1975). Note that prestige bias can be generated through
a form of conformist bias in that individuals choose whom to
copy on the basis of their observed popularity (i.e., copying the
most popular source of advice); however, we cannot rule out the
possibility that sailors are independently choosing the same
prestigious individual as a source of advice.
Evolutionary studies have shown that adopting a prestige bias
in particular domains can confer a ﬁtness advantage (Atkisson
et al., 2012; Chudek et al., 2012). While a longitudinal study
would be required to assess whether adopting a prestige bias
facilitates an individual’s promotion prospects, at the group level
prestige conferred on leaders correlates with team performance
and advice-based prestige correlates with dyadic information
transmission.
We found that social and sporting participation networks have
a signiﬁcant effect on group performance. The role of participa-
tion would appear to give leaders an opportunity to operate on a
level transactional plane with subordinates (Offord et al., 2016).
Our ﬁndings support the call for more follower-based studies of
leadership (e.g., Meindl, 1995) in that follower behaviour is
clearly implicated in affecting leader credibility and team per-
formance (Offord et al., 2016). This in turn has much in common
with in other post-heroic approaches such as ELT. We discovered
that although participation-based prestige affects leader efﬁcacy,
high network cohesion or density during participation does not
appear to affect team performance. We speculate that the parti-
cipation networks function in the building of trust and triggering
of levelling behaviour towards untrusted leaders (Ibid.).
It is possible that the role of professional and personal cred-
ibility in assessing operational information is associated with
wisdom and experience. That both sender and receiver prestige is
involved in successful transmission indicates a difference between
the two advice networks worthy of further explanation. We
speculate that trust implied in a personal advice network makes
prestige more important for both parties than the transmission of
professional advice, which requires only a credible source of
information. Individuals sought as a source of personal advice
may be considered worth listening to and also effective listeners
during team operations.
The empirical results demonstrate that informal advice net-
works exert a positive effect on accurate dyadic information
transmission, but the simulations predict that real-world, hier-
archically-ranked, prestige networks lead to a relatively slow
spread of information through the ship’s company. This reﬂects
an informal observation we made with both crews from HMS
Clyde that information appeared to remain within groups of
high-prestige individuals, resulting in lower-prestige individuals
acquiring less operational information. We had expected high-
prestige individuals to act as a catalyst in percolating information
throughout the network but it appears that they preferentially
pass the information to other high-prestige actors This results in a
prestige gradient such that difﬁculty is encountered in moving
information from low-prestige to high-prestige individuals. Thus
the pathways of information spread may be different paths to
those expected from the formal structure.
Widely distributed prestige results in more efﬁcient informa-
tion transmission than asymmetric distributions do (e.g., ‘top
heavy’ structures) and may have a signiﬁcant impact on team-
work because prestigious individuals who are not formal leaders
facilitate useful information transmission. This challenges a
common assumption that leaders are solely responsible for out-
comes. Although we note that slow information transmission
through the entire ship’s company may or may not be mala-
daptive, depending on context: in some cases efﬁcient running of
the ship might only require that information percolates through a
sub-section of the crew. While we did not have the opportunity to
directly test whether team performance is a function of infor-
mation transmission, our results indirectly suggest that this may
be the case. In future research, we hope to observe the role of the
prestigious leader in directing information and mapping against a
self-reported social network of advice donation, which is com-
plimentary to the current advice-seeking networks.
In conclusion, prestige can be considered as a human analogue
of dominance where status is achieved through the development
of prestige rather than by force (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001).
This places a lot of power in the hands of followers as “prestige
givers” (Barkow et al., 1975). This process shapes the emergence
of informal power structures within groups that are bound to
abide by a formal hierarchical ranking structure and in the long
term may also inﬂuence expectations associated with public roles
(i.e., the transcendental social). Within a strictly hierarchical
system, informally conferred prestige provides a ﬂexible system
that responds to perceived variation in capabilities and effec-
tiveness of colleagues when faced with a shared task or objective.
The conclusions are of signiﬁcance to social science disciplines
engaged in environments where hierarchical top-down leadership
is prevalent. Such environments would not necessarily be military
but might also include the emergency services, the health sector,
private companies (especially engineering) and the charity sector.
The world of work is undergoing signiﬁcant disruption at the
current time in moving from command-and-control decision
making (Industrial Age) to networked bottom-up inﬂuence
(Information Age). These ﬁndings add to the body of knowledge
concerning networked decision making in complex environ-
ments, explaining how prestige adds uniquely to the process.
Data availability
The datasets generated during and/or analysed during the current
study are not publicly available due to the authors anticipating
further use of the datasets. The data are available from the cor-
responding author on reasonable request.
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